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Decided on June 14, 2022
Supreme Court, New York County
Alice Marcondes, Aimee Bellman, Kyle Dixon, Daniel Propati,
Laura Salvatierra, P. Palmer, Christopher Williams, Plaintiff,
against
Fort 710 Associates, L.P., Defendant.

Index No. 160189/2017
Sabrina Kraus, J.
The following efiled documents, listed by NYSCEF document number (Motion 001) 9,
10, 11, 12, 13, 14, 15, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 21, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 27, 41, 44, 45, 46, 48 were
read on this motion to/for ORDER MAINTAIN CLASS ACTION.
BACKGROUND
This action was commenced as a putative class action against Fort 709 Associates, L.P.,
on or about November 15, 2017. Plaintiffs initiated this action, on behalf of themselves and
on behalf of all other past, present and prospective tenants residing at 710 West 173rd Street
in the County, City and State of New York (Subject Premises).
The Subject Premises is subject to rent regulation by virtue of defendant's receipt of J

51 tax benefits. Defendant has continuously received J51 tax benefits commencing in 1998
and expected to terminate in 2032. Plaintiffs allege defendant systematically schemed to
remove tenants from the protections of Rent Stabilization by failing to properly register the
units with DHCR, creating false records of inflated rents with DHCR and in the provision of
leases to tenants, requiring tenants to sign riders waiving rent stabilization and removing
units from rent regulation through fictious Individual Apartment Improvements (IAIs).
PENDING MOTION
On July 26, 2018, plaintiffs moved for an order pursuant to CPLR §901 et seq.
certifying a class and subclass. The motion was initially briefed and submitted to the court on
or about August 13, 2018.
On or about June 22, 2021, said court directed the parties to supplement their
submissions to address how the Court of Appeals holding in Regina Metro Co., LLC v. New
York State Division of Housing and Community Renewal 35 NY3d 332 applies to the pending
motion. The supplemental papers were submitted by plaintiffs in July 2021, and by defendant
in September 2021.
Subsequently, the action and pending motion were assigned to this Court for
determination.
For the reasons stated below, the motion is granted.
ALLEGED FACTS
The Complaint was filed on behalf of current and former tenants who have resided in
the Subject Premises during four years prior to commencement of this action, who have been
treated as deregulated.
This action is one of several related actions:
• Morgan Gould et al v. Fort 250 Associates, Index No. 160190/2017
• Emma Griffith et al v. West 171 Associates, Index No. 159398/2017
• Brian Hoffman et al v. Fort 709 Associates, Index No. 160191 / 2017
• Alice Marcondes et al v. Fort 710 Assoc, Index No. 160189/2017

• Lietavova et al v. 127 East 101 LLC, Index No. 152075/2018
Each of these actions seeks virtually identical relief, based upon substantially the same
fraudulent practice by the landlord being challenged herein.
The buildings in each of those related actions are multiple dwellings located in the
Washington Heights section of Northern Manhattan. Despite being owned by various
corporate entities, they are all owned by the same principal. The principal owner listed on the
Multiple Dwelling Registrations with the Department of Housing Preservation and
Development ("HPD") for the buildings in each case, is Mark Scharfman.
Plaintiffs allege that defendant has continuously received J51 tax benefits, commencing
in 1998, and expected to terminate in 2032. Plaintiffs allege that between 2010 and 2016,
apartments in the Subject Premises were unlawfully deregulated, and that this pattern
permeated not only the Subject Premises, but the buildings in the related cases as well.
In 2016, plaintiff Marcondes commenced her tenancy. Plaintiff Bellman commenced her
tenancy in 2015. Plaintiffs Dixon, Propati, Salvatierra, and Palmer commenced their
tenancies in 2014. Plaintiff Williams commenced his tenancy in 2009. Plaintiffs allege they
were compelled to sign unlawful lease riders entitled "Notice of Unregulated Status,"
waiving their RSL rights, and that this was a fraudulent form rider, and it was defendant's
practice to use it to deceive tenants. These riders were used throughout Mark Scharfman's J
51 buildings in the related cases.
Plaintiffs allege that between 2010 and 2016, defendant consistently and unlawfully
deregulated the tenants' apartments. In 2016, the Attorney General circulated a letter to
landlords, reminding them to [*2]obey the law as determined by Roberts some eight years
before. Plaintiffs allege defendant used this as an opportunity not to correct a good faith
error, but to lock in its ability to overcharge tenants by reregistering numerous apartments at
an unlawfully high rent, having nothing to do with the last rent registered, and exceeding the
rent actually paid by the tenants at that time.
Plaintiffs allege said registrations were a blatant violation of the RSC, RSL, Roberts,
Gersten, and the attorney General's instruction.
With each lease renewal, defendant failed to provide Rent Stabilization riders, which are
mandated by RSL §826511(d). Defendant systematically failed to offer tenants the option of
a one or twoyear lease, when in fact tenants in a J51 Building are entitled to continued

occupancy under the RSC and RSL. Arbitrary evictions, rent hikes, and refusal to renew
leases were constant threats to the tenants of defendant's buildings, including the Subject
Premises.
Further, none of the plaintiffs' leases contain the required J51 notice, "informing such
tenant that the unit shall become subject to deregulation upon the expiration of such [J51]
Tax benefit period," pursuant to RSL §826504(c).
DISCUSSION
Class Certification
The State's rules on class actions, like their federal counterparts, "favor the maintenance
of class actions" and support "a liberal interpretation" (Pruitt v Rockefeller Ctr. Props., 167
AD2d 14, 2021 [1st Dept 1991] [internal quotation marks and citation omitted]; see City of
New York v Maul, 14 NY3d 499, 509 [2010] [Maul] [courts should broadly construe criteria
set forth in CPLR 901 (a)]).
In the context of rentstabilization challenges against landlords who allegedly violated J
51, "CPLR 901 (b) permits . . . plaintiffs to utilize the class action mechanism to recover
compensatory overcharges . . . even though the Rent Stabilization Law of 1969 . . . does not
specifically authorize class action recovery" (Borden v 400 E. 55th St. Assoc., L.P., 24 NY3d
382, 38990 [2014]). Although damages may vary among the class members, this "does not
per se foreclose class certification" (Andryeyeva v New York Health Care, Inc., 33 NY3d 152,
185 [2019]). It is appropriate to bring a class action with one or more representative plaintiffs
if 1) the size of the class is so large that it is impracticable to include them all as named
plaintiffs, 2) common questions of law or fact predominate over questions which only impact
one or more class members, 3) the named plaintiffs assert claims which are typical of the
claims of the class, 4) the representative plaintiffs are appropriate individuals who will fairly,
adequately protect the class' interests, and 5) a class action is the best and most efficient way
to proceed (CPLR 901 [a]). The court considers these five factors in its evaluation of whether
a class action is appropriate (Rabouin v Metropolitan Life Ins. Co., 25 AD3d 349, 350 [1st
Dept 2006]).
Courts liberally construe the criteria in part because "the Legislature intended article 9
to be a liberal substitute for the narrow class action legislation which preceded it" (Maul, 14
NY3d at 509 [citation and internal quotation marks omitted]). "The determination of whether
. . . a matter qualifies as a class action . . . rests within the sound discretion of the motion

court" (Rabouin, 25 AD3d at 350). However, the class representatives must satisfy an
evidentiary burden, absent which the court denies certification. For example, "general and
conclusory allegations in the affirmation of . . . counsel and the exhibits attached thereto" will
not suffice (Rallis v City of New York, 3 AD3d 525, 526 [2d Dept 2004]).
It is well settled that qualified plaintiffs may use the class action mechanism to recover
rent overcharges against landlords who deregulated apartments in contravention of the Rent
Stabilization Laws while accepting tax benefits under New York City's J51 tax abatement
program (Hoffman v Fort 709 Associates LP 204 AD3d 516).
There are five prerequisites for class certification: numerosity, common questions,
typicality, adequacy of representation and superiority.
Numerosity
CPLR § 901(a)(1) requires that the individuals constituting the class be so numerous
that joinder of all members is impossible. There is no mechanical test or set quantity of
prospective class members which must exist to determine whether the class membership is so
numerous as to make actual joinder impracticable. Pajaczek v. Rema Construction Corp., 18
Misc 2d 1140(A) (Sup. Ct. NY Co., 2005), citing Pesantez v. Boyle Envtl. Servs., 251 AD2d
11 (1st Dept. 1998). It has been held that the legislature contemplated classes involving as
few as 18 members (Borden v 400 E 55th St. Assoc. LP 24 NY3d 382, 383).
In this case there are 47 units alleged to be involved and some of those units have had
multiple tenants during the applicable period. Plaintiffs assert that accounting for co
tenancies and tenants who have lived in those apartments within the last four years and
moved out, the number of affected members of the class is close to one hundred (100).
Plaintiffs further allege that the class is easily defined because every unit in the Subject
Premises is subject to rent stabilization, every deregulation was unlawful, every deregulated
rent charged within the last four years prior to commencement of this action is an unlawful
overcharge, and every "Notice of Deregulated Status" during the same period was a willful
deception of the tenants.
Finally, plaintiffs argue that the precise number of unlawful leases provided to the scores
of current and former tenants during the relevant period is information that is under the
control and knowledge of the defendant and must be disclosed to accurately determine the
size of the class. See Gross v. Ticketmaster, 5 Misc 3d 1005 (Sup. Ct. NY Co. 2004); Smith v.

Atlas International Tours, 89 AD2d 762, Grumman Aerospace Corp. v. Rice, 196 AD2d 572,
573 (2d Dept. 1993). See also Berenstein v. Kelso & Company Inc., 213 AD2d 314 (1st Dept.
1997).
Based on the foregoing analysis the court finds plaintiffs have established the element of
numerosity.
Plaintiffs Have Established Commonality
Under Borden, commonality is satisfied. There, as here, "the predominant legal question
involves one that applies to the entire class—whether the apartments were unlawfully
deregulated" while the owner received J51 benefits" (Borden, 24 NY3d at 399). The single
legal question of violating the J51 requirements, common to the entire class, is enough to
warrant class certification. See In re Coordinated Title Ins. Cases, 2 Misc 3d 1007(A);
Akerman v. Price Waterhouse, 252 AD2d 179, 201 (1st Dept. 1998).
Commonality does not mandate identical issues. It merely requires the predominance of
the central question, which is whether, in this case, the defendant is in violation of its J51
obligations. See Weinberg v. Hertz Corp., 116 AD2d 1 (1st Dept. 1986) aff'd, 69 NY2d 979
(1986), Pludeman v. Northern Leasing Systems, Inc., 74 AD3d 420 (1st Dept. 2010). The
alleged fraudulent scheme perpetrated through unlawful leases, false notices, and unlawful,
improper registrations, predominates in this action. The issue renders the class action
appropriate to achieve the economies of time, effort and expense and promote uniformity of
decision and to persons similarly situated. Friar v. Vanguard Holding Corp., 78 AD2d 83, 97
(2d Dept. 1980).
Based on the foregoing, the court finds plaintiffs have established the element of
commonality.
Typicality
Typicality ensures similarity of the claims of the representative plaintiffs and the other
class members. The requirement is satisfied if the "plaintiff's claim derives from the same
practice or course of conduct that give rise to remaining claims of other class members and is
based upon the same legal theory." Friar, supra at 99.
Plaintiffs allege that based on the unlawful riders, and illegal registrations a clear pattern
of defendant's fraud is established not only as to the Subject Premises but also in the other

related actions and that the fraud is typical of that perpetrated by defendant against tenants in
its J51 buildings.
The paramount issue on typicality is defendant's conduct, and the fact that the extent of
the damage may vary from apartment to apartment does not preclude class certification. See
Pludeman, supra 424. The proposed class representatives and other class members therefore
rely on a common course of conduct and a common legal theory for relief. Thus, typicality is
satisfied. See Roberts, supra.
Plaintiffs Have Established Adequate Representation
Courts evaluate satisfaction of CPLR §901(a)(4)'s prerequisite by focusing on
essentially three factors: potential conflicts of interest, personal characteristics of the
proposed class representative, and the quality of class counsel. Pruitt v. Rockefeller Center
Properties, Inc., 1991, 167 AD2d 14, 24 (1st Dep't).
There is no conflict between the representatives and class members because the class
representatives are experiencing the type of damages that are emblematic of the systematic
deprivation of rent regulatory rights being perpetrated building wide. Plaintiffs further allege
that the class representatives have met with counsel, are in frequent contact with counsel
relating to the issues in this [*3]case, have thoroughly reviewed the lawsuit and have verified
the Complaint on personal knowledge.
Defendant argues that the affidavits submitted by plaintiffs are insufficient. However the
affidavits are submitted in connection with the complaint that was verified by plaintiffs and
includes allegations that the representative plaintiffs will fairly and adequately represent and
protect the interests of the class and that there are no conflicts between the members of the
class and the plaintiffs. The verified complaint is properly treated as an affidavit in this
circumstance [Cupka v. Remik Holdings LLC, 202 AD3d 473, 474 (2022)].
The named plaintiffs' financial circumstances are irrelevant because their attorneys
represent them pro bono (citing Wilder v May Dept. Stores Co., 23 AD3d 646, 648649 [2d
Dept 2005]; see also Gudz v Jemrock Realty Co., LLC, 105 AD3d 625, 626 [1st Dept 2013]
[plaintiff's "financial ability to adequately represent the class . . . was adequately shown by
counsel's assumption of the risk of costs and expenses in the litigation"], aff'd sub nom
Borden, 24 NY3d 382).
Defendant does not challenge the competency of counsel in opposition.

As defendant has not argued that a conflict exists between the interests of plaintiffs and
the other class members, that plaintiffs' financial resources are inadequate, or that counsel is
inadequate, defendant essentially concedes plaintiffs' adequacy (Pruitt v Rockefeller Ctr.
Props. 167 AD2d 14, 24).
Based on the foregoing, the court finds plaintiffs have established adequate
representation.
The Waiver of Treble Damages Submitted by Plaintiffs is Sufficient
Each plaintiff herein has submitted an affidavit explicitly waiving any claim for treble
damages pursuant to CPLR §901(b).
In Yang v Creative Ind. Corp. (2018 NY Slip Op. 33209 [U] [Sup Ct, NY County
2018]), the trial court found that a similar waiver was adequate to support certification.
Specifically, the Yang Court stated the plaintiffs' affidavits "demonstrate[ed] their
understanding that, while they otherwise may be entitled to treble damages, they are, for
purposes of class certification, and in prosecuting a class action, agreeing to relinquish the
right to treble damages" and that the waiver was effective and "in harmony with CPLR 901"
(id. at *2).
The court makes the same finding in the case at bar.
Superiority — CPLR §901(a)(5)
"In determining superiority, courts consider a number of factors, including the
possibility of excessive costs and delays resulting from multiple lawsuits seeking the same or
similar relief, inconsistent rulings, and whether the aggregation of the claims will allow
individuals with small claims judicial relief that would otherwise be impractical" (Onadia v
City of New York, 56 Misc 3d 309, 321322 [Sup Ct, Bronx County 2017] [citing Globe
Surgical Supply v GEICO Ins. Co., 59 AD3d 129, 146147 [2d Dept 2008]). Courts
especially stress that where "the relatively insignificant amount of damages suffered by many
members of the class makes individual actions cost prohibitive, and the large number of class
members renders consolidation unworkable, a class action [may be] not only superior but,
indeed, the only practical method of adjudication" (Pruitt, 167 AD2d at 24). Further, courts
acknowledge "the public benefit aspect of the class action," which can "induc[e] socially and
ethically responsible behavior" in defendants who are wealthier and more powerful than the

plaintiffs who seek redress (id. at 23).
Defendant argues that a class action is not the best method of litigating the claims of the
proposed class. Instead, it maintains that plaintiffs' cases are best suited to individual
treatment before the HCR, which agency they also argue should be afforded primary
jurisdiction over such disputes.
The court concludes that a class action is the superior method of adjudication of this
matter. "Under the facts alleged, the alternatives to a class action would be individual [J51
overcharge] actions by tenants or administrative proceedings. It is clear that this class action
lawsuit conserves judicial resources by avoiding a multiplicity of lawsuits involving the same
basic facts" (Casey v Whitehouse Estates, Inc., 36 Misc 3d 1225 [A], 2012 NY Slip Op
51471 [U] at *6 [Sup Ct, NY County 2012]). As the Court of Appeals stated in Pruitt, where,
as here, individual actions may be cost prohibitive to many of the class members, a class
action is the most practical method of adjudication" (167 AD2d at 24; see Jill & Phil's
Family Pharm. v Aetna U.S. Healthcare, 271 AD2d 281, 282 [1st Dept 2000]). As noted,
there is also a public benefit to this class action in that it may induce more responsible
behavior in landlords. The money it would cost to litigate the proceedings individually also
militates in favor of moving forward as a class (Dugan, 45 Misc 3d at 380). In addition, as
the court in Dugan stated, it is more efficient and apt to devise a uniform formula for
calculating [*4]overcharges and determining other issues (id.). Furthermore, "[b]ecause these
questions relating to liability are common and predominate for the entire class, a class action
on liability conserves judicial resources even if . . . the use of subclasses or a special master"
is necessary to make individualized assessments (id.).
Defendant's argument that a class action is an inferior method of adjudication ignores
binding legal precedent. In Borden, the Court of Appeals held the opposite, stating that
"permitting plaintiffs to bring [J51] claims as a class accomplishes the purpose of CPLR 901
(b)" (Borden, 24 NY3d at 394). Further, the Court stated that "class certification is superior to
having these claims adjudicated individually" from the standpoint of judicial economy (id. at
400). The Court also found that "the amount of damages suffered by each class member
typically varies from individual to individual, but that fact will not prevent the suit from
going forward as a class action if the important legal or factual issues involving liability are
common to the class" (Borden, 24 NY3d at 399 [internal quotation marks and citation
omitted]; see also Hess v EDR Assets LLC, 171 AD3d 498, 498 [1st Dept 2019] [citing
Borden]).

More recently, in Maddicks (34 NY3d 116), the Court of Appeals denied a motion to
dismiss under CPLR § 3211, reaffirming that J51 cases are amenable to class actions.[FN1]
Defendant's position that these matters should be adjudicated before HCR also is
inconsistent with the prevailing caselaw. In Collazo v Netherland Prop. Assets LLC (35
NY3d 987, 990 [2020]) the Court of Appeals found that, under the Housing Stability and
Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA), "'[t]he courts and [DHCR] shall have concurrent
jurisdiction, subject to the tenant's choice of forum (L 2019, ch 36, Part F, §§ 1, 3).'" The
Court concluded that "plaintiffs' choice of forum controls" (Collazo, 35 NY3d at 990).[FN2]
Additional Criteria
Plaintiffs contend that they have satisfied the factors set forth in CPLR 902, which a
court considers if it determines that certification is appropriate under CPLR 901:
1. The interest of members of the class in individually controlling the prosecution
or defense of separate actions;
2. The impracticability or inefficiency of prosecuting or defending separate
actions;
3. The extent and nature of any litigation concerning the controversy already
commenced by or against members of the class;
4. The desirability or undesirability of concentrating the litigation of the claim in
the particular forum;
5. The difficulties likely to be encountered in the management of a class action.
(CPLR §902). The court already has considered most of these factors, and for the
reasons discussed above finds that [*5]plaintiffs have established that these factors support
certification of the class.
The Decision in Regina Metro Co., LLC v. New York State Division of Housing
and Community Renewal 3(5 NY3d 332) does not warrant a different outcome
Regina held interalia, that applying certain aspects of Part F of the Housing Stability
and Tenant Protection Act of 2019 (HSTPA), which amended the RSL would be
unconstitutional. The determination of unconstitutionality addressed due process concerns
that the Court of Appeals had in relation to the HSTPA. Part F of the HSTPA mandated that

DHCR "consider all available rent history, which is reasonably necessary to investigate
overcharge claims and determine legal regulated rent, regardless of the vintage of that
history." Part F also increased the 4year record retention period to 6 years. It further
provided that where a landlord does not keep records beyond the 6year period, the Courts
and DHCR can still review the entire rental history, which could predate the 6year period.
The Court of Appeals struck the retroactive application of this statute as unconstitutional.
There is no claim in this action that the HSTPA amendments are applicable to the pending
class action motion.
Part F of the HSTPA amended the RSL, New York City Administrative Code §26516
and CPLR §213a, which governs claims for rent overcharges and the statute of limitations
for those claims. The newly enacted legislation directed that the statutory amendments in Part
F of the HSTPA "shall take effect immediately and shall apply to any claims pending or filed
on or after such date."
Regina held that applying Part F's amendments retroactively to plaintiffs' claim would
violate substantive due process.Therefore, the amendments to the RSL as set forth in the
HSTPA would not affect this action. Instead, the preamendment version of the RSL's
overcharge statute, New York City Administrative Code §26516, and the decisions that
interpret it, are controlling in this action. No damages for an overcharge may be awarded
beginning more than 4 years from the filing of the action. See Dugan v. London Terrace
Gardens, 177 AD3d 1 (1st Dept. 2019).
Defendant argues that Regina is relevant in that the decision addresses the proof
necessary for a finding of fraud and the application of the default formula. While certainly
said language is relevant to this action, the ruling in Regina does not impact plaintiffs' motion
for class certification. The question of fraud is a factual determination to be resolved at trial
and upon completion of discovery, but not one that bars certification of the class.
CONCLUSION
Wherefore, it is hereby:
ORDERED that the motion for class certification is granted; and it is further
ORDERED that the class shall consist of current, prospective and former tenants in
apartments in the Subject Premises from November 15, 2013 forward where the apartments
were deregulated by defendant (the "Class"); and it is further

ORDERED that Alice Marcondes, Aimee Bellman, Kyle Dixon, Daniel Propati, Laura
Salvatierra, Phillip Palmer and Christopher Williams are the lead plaintiffs and class
representatives; and it is further
ORDERED that Jack L. Lester, Esq and Grimble & LoGuidice, LLC are appointed as
class cocounsel; and it is further
ORDERED that the parties are directed to meet and confer on the contents of the class
action notice and publication order; and the parties are directed to submit to this court within
30 days (by efiling and email to tszap@nycourts.gov) either an agreedupon joint proposed
notice and publication order, or alternative proposed notices and publication orders for this
court's selection; and it is further
ORDERED that, within 20 days from entry of this order, plaintiffs shall serve a copy of
this order with notice of entry on the Clerk of the General Clerk's Office (60 Centre Street,
Room 119); and it is further
ORDERED that such service upon the Clerk shall be made in accordance with the
procedures set forth in the Protocol on Courthouse and County Clerk Procedures for
Electronically Filed Cases (accessible at the "EFiling" page on the court's website at the
address www.nycourts.gov/supctmanh);]; and it is further
ORDERED that this constitutes the decision and order of this court.
6/14/2022
SABRINA KRAUS, J.S.C.
Footnotes
Footnote 1: The dissenting justices in Maddicks did not dispute this issue. In Maddicks, the
plaintiffs lived in 20 different apartment buildings, and the allegations were that the landlords
in those buildings charged inflated rents through more than one scheme. Some landlords
allegedly did not provide rentstabilized leases to tenants while they accepted J51 benefits.
Other landlords allegedly lied about the expenses they incurred in individual apartment
improvements (IAIs). Another group of landlords allegedly inadequately registered the
apartments in their buildings. Finally, a fourth group of landlords purportedly inflated fair
market rents on apartments that previously were subject to rent control (Maddicks, 34 NY3d
at 130131). Thus, according to the dissent, there was not a single predominant legal issue.
Here, on the other hand, the complaint involves one building and alleges one scheme.
Footnote 2: Justice Rivera, who dissenting in part, agreed with the majority on this issue (see

Collazo, 35 NY3d at 991).
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